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This paper focuses on the relationship between technical and
 
institutional changes in Cuba a leader in the use of continuous­

process technologies being applied to cane sugar manufacture in
 
the first three decades of the twentieth century. Using a fixed
 
effects model of the sugar manufacturer's decision to invest in
 
new technologies, we show that a change in institutional factors
 
had an impact on the adoption of the new technologies. The
 
results show that differences in cane contracting arrangements
 
affected the ease with which mills adopted new technologies.
 
These differences were based on historical factors in the
 
evolution of the cane farming institution in Cuba that affected
 
whether the cane lands were the property of the farmer or the
 
mill. This distinction created differences in the cane farmers'
 
bargaining positions in the renegotiation of contracts with the
 
mill, and it resulted in variation in the long-run costs of
 
procuring cane at different mills.
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, production techniques in sugar 
"'.', manufacturing changed so dramatically that a major restructuring of cane sugar enterprises was 
necessary if cane sugar producers were to remain competitive. In the 1880s, this was due to the 
threat of the European beet sugar industry, which was growing rapidly. But afterwards, 
innovations, based on greater exploitation of continuous processing methods, were introduced and 
adopted by cane sugar producers. By the turn of the twentieth century, cane sugar technology had 
been fundamentally altered. These innovations were related to techniques being adopted in many 
processing industries in the industrialized world at the same time - in petroleum refining, 
distilling and food processing, etc. So the alteration in sugar manufacturing was essentially an 
extension of a technical revolution being experienced generally in processing and refining 
industries (Chandler, 1977). 
At the same time, the organization of labor on cane plantations was also changing. Many 
formerly prosperous slave-based sugar-producing areas were in decline because of labor shortages 
after emancipation. The variety of institutional responses to this situation in the history of the 
sugar industry has attracted the attention of economic historians who examine its implications for 
the relationship between technical and institutional changes (Engerman, 1983, 1984, 1986; 
Shlomowitz, 1979a, 1979b, 1984; LaCroix and Roumasset, 1990). In this regard, the literature 
has tended to ask questions about the effects of the technical factors on the institutions, with 
special attention given to labor institutions. In this paper, we focus on the obverse and show 
quantitatively that a change in institutional factors had an impact on the adoption of the new 
technologies in one of the leading sugar producing islands (in terms both of market share and of 
the adoption of continuous-process techniques) -- Cuba. 1 Regional differences in cane 
I This figure includes both cane and beet sugar. Cuba produced over 20 percent of all sugar (both 
cane and beet) and over 30 percent of the cane sugar on the world market. The other clearly dominant 
producer was Java. Cuba and Java produced over SO percent of the cane sugar on the world market and 
2
 
contracting arrangements, based on historical factors in the evolution of the cane farming 
institution in Cuba, affected the ease with which mills adopted new technologies. 
With the new technologies, the organization of the sugar industry in Cuba changed 
dramatically as the nineteenth-century slave-based plantation system was replaced by a central 
factory system. Several major changes should be pointed out. First, sugarmills became highly 
capital-intensive relative to the mills of the plantation system. And along with the capital 
intensification, the optimal scale of mills using the new technologies increased enormously. A 
high rate of growth in the capacities of mills in Cuba proceeded from before the turn of the 
century to 1929. As a consequence of the increase in the optimal scale of production, the 
manufacturing (milling) operations of the existing plantations on the island came to be 
consolidated into many fewer centralized mills, called centrales; yet the agricultural operations ­
the activity of cane cultivation and the cane plantations -- remained decentralized in the hands of 
farmers, known in Cuba as colonos. This system of centralized milling and decentralized cane 
cultivation in Cuba was called the ~ system.2 A second observation, although larger mill 
capacities (associated with newer technical vintages) were adopted in all parts of the island, the 
mill capacities in the east, an area of new expansion of the sugar industry, were in general much 
larger than mill capacities in the western provinces, where the plantation-based industry of the 
over 30 percent of all sugar on the market. These figures on based on estimates of world supplies made by 
Deerr. They tend to underestimate the share of cane sugar production on the world market. See Deerr 
(1950), pp. 490-91. Refined cane and beet sugars, by the twentieth century, were virtually 
indistinguishable, and so from the point of view of consumption they were perfect substitutes. 
2 Cane farming developed in many parts of the world at around the same time, though institutional 
details of cane farming varied from place to place. An analysis of the economic conditions surrounding the 
establishment of the cane farming system in Queensland around the turn of the twentieth century, see 
Shlomowitz (1979a, 1982, 1984). The establishment of the colono system began relatively early in Cuba, 
prior to the abolition of slavery in 1886, see Scott (1984, 1985). The colono system was later adopted in 
other former colonies of Spain, see Moreno Fraginals (1986), Ramos Mattei (1984), del Castillo (1985), 
and Nagano (1988). Other cane farming systems developed in these decades in the English-speaking 
Caribbean, see Johnson (1972), and Haraksingh (1984). 
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nineteenth century had existed. 
The empirical results of this paper show that regional differences in the contractual 
arrangements between the centrales and the colonos had a significant influence on why mills 
adopted larger capacities in the east. (l) In the first section, we analyze the bargaining relations 
between the colonos and the ~ to show that there is reason to expect that the bargaining 
relationship affected the ease with which sugarmills could expand the capacities of their mills in 
order to adopt new, large-scale technologies. (2) In the second section, we present a quantitative 
method for detecting the effects of these institutional influences on the expansion behavior of mills 
based on the estimation of a fixed effects model of the investment decisions of sugarmill 
managers. The results show that in the western pan of the island the adoption of larger scales of 
production was hindered by institutional factors that raised the costs of securing the sugarmills' 
cane supplies. As a late-corner, the east benefited because investors there had greater flexibility in 
forming institutional arrangements that suited them (Cf. Gerschenkron, 1979). 
The data used in the study come from two rich, previously unexamined sources. The 
papers of the sugar producer and broker, Manuel Rionda, recently made available, provide 
extensive records of factor price data and the operation of sugarmiIls.3 Records of mill 
production statistics, published by the Republica de Cuba, Secretar(a de Agricultura, Comercio, y 
Trabajo, provide a panel of 13 years and 130 sugarmills which includes data on the capacities and 
performance of the mills. It is used to model the investment behavior of the mills, to estimate the 
fixed effects and infer the influence of institutional factors on the adoption of new technologies. 
3 The Braga Brothers Collection, University Archives, Gainesville, Florida, is a business archives 
whose principal holdings are related to the Czarnikow-Rionda Company of New York, one of the leading 
sugar brokerage houses of the twentieth century, and its affiliate, the Cuban Trading Company, which 
bandied a large proportion of the exports from Cuba. Also it contains the personal and business papers of 
Manuel Rionda y Polledo, founder and president of the company. Many of these papers are related to the 
management of sugar estates that he and his family owned; included are reports of other sugar estates in 
Cuba. Data used in this paper are from Record Groups 11 and IV. 
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The use of panel data offers econometric advantages. Most important, differencing allows us to 
avoid the specification bias which would otherwise be present since important individual features 
of mills are unobservable. The results show that, after accounting for individual investment 
incentives, the expansion behavior of individual mills is strongly correlated with the prevalence of 
colonos independientes at the mills - colonos who owned the land they cultivated. But also 
important was the mill's orientation towards North America. The evidence supports our 
hypothesis that the regional variations in mill capacities were influenced by differences in the 
bargaining positions of the colonos who owned their land relative to those who did not. 
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING. 
The period 1899-1929 was a period of rapid growth in sugar production in Cuba's history 
whose beginning and end mark two major crises. The year 1899 was the end of the Cuban War 
of Independence (1895-98), in which the sugar industry had suffered enormous damage, 
production declined by two-thirds during the war and took more than half a decade to recover its 
prewar level of production once the war had ended. (See Figure 1.) The endpoint, 1929, marks 
the beginning of the depression in the Vnited States and the increase in protection of Cuba's major 
market for sugar finalized by the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. Between these years was a 
period of V.S. intervention in Cuba that precipitated a huge influx of North American capital and 
established close business links between North American and Cuban sugar interests. Cuba during 
this period received a 20 percent discount on the standard sugar tariff, which allowed Cuban 
producers to compete, albeit on an unequal basis, with American beet sugar producers and 
producers in Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, all of which had duty free status. The 
Cuban provision of the V.S. demand for sugar between 1910 and 1929 fluctuated between 40 and 
J:.
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6S percent and tended to be higher in the twenties (V.S. Congressional Committee on Agriculture, 
1962). 
( 
The huge increase in the capacities of sugarmills in Cuba is seen in Table 1 where the 
average level of sugar production per mill in Cuba increased from 1877 to 1929 by 7200 ­ an 
annual rate of 8.3 percent on average. The growth in the capacities of individual mills was steady 
throughout the period. The technology was capital-embodied, but the larger mill capacities, which 
offered economies of scale, could be adopted gradually because the capacity could be increased by 
adding additional machinery units to existing capacity. Larger scales of production were, indeed, 
c adopted gradually because there were sizeable adjustments costs associated with the expansion of 
mill capacity which prevented the immediate adoption of the largest scales of production.4 The 
mill capacities achieved were considerably higher in the eastern provinces. Contemporaries and 
historians commonly noticed the difference and emphasized the correspondence between the large 
mill capacities in the east and the greater presence of North American capital (Guerra y S~chez, 
( 
1944; P~rez, 1986, 1988). But behind these capital flows were incentives that made the east more 
attractive to investors than the west. Table 2 presents data to demonstrate these differences. The 
"east" consisted of the province of Oriente and Camagiiey, and the "west" consisted of Habana, 
Matanzas and the western part of Santa Clara. The contrast between the east and west is seen 
most clearly in comparison of the provinces of Camagiiey, which was the most recent area of 
expansion, and Matanzas, which was the heart of the nineteenth-century industry. (See the map in 
Figure 2 for the location of the provinces.) The figures in Table 2 on the percentage of cane 
4 Adjustment costs are defined as costs associated with rate of capital accumulation, which increase 
with the rate of investment. Empirical evidence of both the economies of scale and the magnitude of 
adjustment costs is presented in Dye (1991). An implication of this fmding is that the adjustment costs 
caused the optimal vintage to be adopted only gradually, and the presence of significant adjustment costs 
which helps explain why we observe a pattern of steady growth in the size of individual mills over the 
period rather than a sudden adoption of larger scales. Modifications in technology and organizational 
methods over time probably also contributed to the pattern. 
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ground by mills with greater than 400 thousand bag capacities show some resemblance between 
the provincial aggregates of western province of Habana and the eastern province of Oriente. 
This reflects urbanization and the construction of three large, modern mills in Habana. A few 
mills with more than 400 thousand bag capacities were built in each of the western provinces, but 
)' 
most of the mills that reached capacities of 400 thousand bags were in the east. The arguments 
we pose in the first section of the paper are framed in terms of this west-east distinction to follow 
contemporary views as well as to aid the exposition; however, the empirical analysis in the second 
section of the paper is performed at the mill level so that the conclusions we draw are not 
dependent on provincial aggregates. 
) 
Technical constraints and the reorganization. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century the last of the nineteenth-century, self-contained 
plantations, known in Cuba as ingenios, finally disappeared. The ingenios, organized along lines 
suited for slave-based production and the old milling technologies, replaced by large-scale 
centrales. The restructuring of the system of production resulted in consolidation of the milling 
, ) 
processes; but the activity of cane cultivation remained decentralized, and cane cultivated by 
colonos took on greater importance. Regarding the figures in Table 1, the 1860 production per 
mill represents the average mill capacities of the ingenio system, and the figures for 1913 and 
1929 demonstrate the growth in the mill capacities in the centrales. 
Implicit in these figures, the new continuous-processing techniques in sugar manufacturing 
tended to have much higher optimal scales of operation than the techniques they replaced. 
Chandler describes the fundamental change which took place with the adoption of capital­
embodied continuous-processing as a radical increase in the minimum volume of materials that 
J
could be handled economically. The greater capital intensification of production implied a much 
7 
c higher ratio of fixed costs in the total outlays (Chandler, 1990). But also in order to realize the 
cost advantages of larger scales of production, improvements in the coordination and 
synchronization of the flow of materials within the plant was necessary. Coordination failures, 
bottlenecks in the flow of materials, reduced the volume and could result in substantially higher 
unit fixed costs. Therefore, careful coordination of inputs and intermediate materials, in 
particular the cane, between the various activities in the sugarmills was essential for the efficient 
operation of the modem, continuous-process plants. 
Two features of cane cultivation imposed important additional technical constraints on the 
restructuring of production. One made the problem of coordination between the harvest and the 
mills particularly crucial for manufacturing processes. During the harvest, cane after being cut 
deteriorates quickly; generally it has to be ground within 24 hours to avoid significant loss of 
sucrose.s The larger mill capacities required much larger supplies of cane, and since no 
significant improvements in cultivation techniques had been developed for centuries, cane had to 
be brought to the mills from much larger distances. The use of railroad networks to haul cane 
r 
'­
over the large distances to the mills became essential to insure the rapid delivery of cane, in order 
to avoid significant loss of sucrose. These requirements caused centrales to adopt a hub-and­
spoke system of cane supply in which the canefields were located as near as possible to the ~ 
and connected to it by raillines.6 The second characteristic is that cane is a perennial crop. 
S The object was to obtain high volumes of sucrose in the cane, which was extracted and crystallized in 
the milling process. Sucrose, glucose and fructose are all present in cane, but only the sucrose was useful 
to the producer. The other sugars,commonly referred to by sugar manufacturers as invert sugars, did not 
crystallize or provide the desired taste, so the economic value of the cane was directly related to the sucrose 
content of the cane. When the cane was cut, the sucrose in the cane began the process of inversion of the 
sucrose into the other sugar forms--glucose and fructose. In general, it had to be ground 24 hours after 
being cut to avoid a significant loss of sucrose (Deerr, 1911; Robertson, 1934). 
6 Furthermore, the harvest (1d!f!!) had to be accomplished during the dry season, which in Cuba was 
between December and June. This meant that the milling plant was only employed for roughly six months 
out of the year; therefore, efficient use of this capital during the limited period of the ldlfr! was even more 
crucial. When the zafra commenced in the winter, it proceeded feverishly as a race to grind as much cane 
r" 
'-... 
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After the initial crop, ratoons (or canes grown from the roots of previously planted crops) could 
be harvested about once a year for 6 to 10 years. (Cane matured in Cuba in between 12 to 15 
months.) Therefore, for the~, the establishment of canefields was a capital investment. 
Because of the problem of deterioration, the investments in canefields and railroads resulted in 
significant site-specificity of the ~'s assets in the fields and created strong incentives for the 
~ to maintain control over these investments (Williamson, 1985). The profitability to the 
~ of the machinery at the mill, the railroad, and the canefields themselves was in question 
unless the ~ was assured of sufficient cane supplies for the life of the equipment. Because 
the railroad network was, for all practical purposes, fixed once it was laid down, the ~ was 
committed to the cane lands surrounding the railroad. 
At the same time, another aspect of the restructuring of the system of production had to 
do with a reorganization of the structure of property rights to the canefields. The formation of 
central factories did away with the vertical integration of the cane cultivation and sugar 
manufacturing activities under the plantation system. Until the last few decades of the nineteenth 
century, cane cultivation and sugar manufacture were typically performed in the self-contained, 
slave-based plantation. But around the middle of the nineteenth century the cane farming system, 
or £Q!QnQ system, began to appear. Initially it was an institutional innovation, stimulated by the 
decline in the slave trade, adopted by owners of in~enios to attract white labor for cane cultivation 
as the slave trade was ending in Cuba. As slaves became scarcer, the owners of in~enios 
apportioned their land and leased it to colonos who contracted to supply cane to the owner's mill. 
But the formation of the &Q1QnQ system became inseparable from the development of the ~. 
as possible before the rainy season arrived again. Therefore, the coordination between the canefields and 
the mills during the zafra was crucial to the successful operation of the mill. We have shown elsewhere that 
coordination of the delivery of cane to the mills, based on diversification of canefields, resulted in much 
larger optimal scales of production (Dye, 1991). 
) 
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(On the nineteenth-century £Q1.Qn.Q system, see Scott, 1984, 1985; Bergad, 1990; and Moreno 
Fraginals 1986.) As the number of mills needed to absorb the cane being produced on the island 
was reduced greatly, some owners of in2enjos ceased to mill their own cane to become coJonos 
contracting with other mills. The timing of these changes can be explained in part by the financial 
crisis after the Ten Years War (1968-78) (Bergad, 1990). While many planters could not raise the 
operating capital to grind their cane at their own jn2enios, they could obtain contracts and 
advances to harvest their cane and grind it at other mills. But advantages to these cane 
contracting arrangements became evident, and the ~ system eventually became the principal 
institution to support the enormous cane requirements of the centrales'? By 1905, 70 percent of 
all the cane supplied to mills in Cuba was supplied by colonos. (See Table 3.) 
Regional differences in contractual relations. 
The tenure arrangements for cane production in Cuba were classified according to three 
categories based on whether production was managed by the ~ directly or through the ~ 
system, and whether the ~ occupied land owned by the ~ or not. Direct management 
of the canefields by the salaried personnel of the ~ was referred to as the "administration 
system," and the cane that was so derived was referred to as "administration cane." Under the 
~ system, the contract between the ~ and the ~ was a share contract in which the 
coJono agreed to supply the cane produced from a specified plot of land (the colonia) to the 
~ in return for a specified share of the sugar produced from that cane. The contract also 
1 Given the site-specificity of the assets in the canefields, why this occurred is an interesting question. 
Williamson (1985) suggests that this kind of asset specificity presents the strongest incentives for vertical 
integration. A careful examination of monitoring costs and risk dispersion is needed to answer the question, 
but this must be left to another paper. The argument here depends on another feature of the contractual 
relation -- the question of the retention of capital assets at the termination of a contract. To address this 
issue, we assume that the revealed preference for the decentralized cQlono system was the result of a 
rational calculation of benefits and costs. 
( 
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usually included lease and credit agreements through which the £Q!QnQ obtained access to land and 
:)credit advances for the work contracted; however, the extent to which the ~ depended on the 
~ for land and credit varied with his means. The colonos were not homogeneous. They 
varied from being locally influential, large landowners (sometimes absentee, possibly foreign) to 
~, 
landless tenants with little means. The landless~, who depended on the lease of a plot of i 
I 
land from the ~ was referred to as a ~~ ~; and the ~ of greater means, 
who contracted out the services of his own often sizeable tracts of land, was referred to as a 
~ independiente.8 
The three classifications of tenure arrangements were, then, the administration plantations, 
the colonias ~ ~, and the colonjas independjeptes. The distribution of the cane supplies of ) 
centrales deriving from these three different classifications of tenure arrangements for the period 
from 1905 to 1929 can be observed in Table 3. The lower panel shows that the proportion of 
colonos independientes was considerably higher in the west than in the east. Although by 1930 
the pattern was becoming much less distinct, in the years of expansion prior to 1930 it was quite 
distinct. Over time an increasing share of cane was derived from colonos ~ !.Qi ceotrales. 
)
The geographical distribution of the colonos independientes was related to the different 
timing of development of the sugar industries of the west and the east. In the western provinces 
of Habana and Matanzas, most of the good cane lands were in cultivation by the 1850s; therefore, 
the inienios there were forced to consolidate if they were to adopt the new large-scale 
technologies. In contrast, the sparsely populated, eastern provinces of Oriente and Camagiiey had 
abundant cane land. Prior to the War of Independence, less than 10 percent of the Cuban sugar 
8 There has been a tendency in the economic history literature to consider the £Q!QnQ as a smallholder. 
Initially. in the nineteenth century the institution was set up to attract smallholders, but with the process of 
centralization of milling many larger landholders were attracted to contracting cane as colooos. (See 
Engerman (1983, Bergad (1990), and Scott (1984). By the twentieth century, the ~'s lands could be as 
large or larger than the plantations of the ingenio system. 
) 
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crop came from the east, though by the twenties the east came to produce the major part of the 
Cuban crop. Consolidation of old estates was thus necessary in the west but not in the east. In 
the east. the large-scale central factories were constructed in frontier areas new to the sugar 
r 
" industry without the institutional vestiges of the older system.9 In those areas, contractual 
relations were developed at the same time that the mills were established such that the cane 
requirements of the new technology were taken into consideration at their formation. The 
Commission on Cuban Affairs invited by Cuban President Carlos Mendieta in 1934 to review 
economic conditions in Cuba came to the same conclusion: that many of the colonos in the west 
were independientes originating from planter families of the nineteenth century, and many of the 
estates of colonos in the west were once estates of the ingenio system. The east, being an area of 
new expansion, did not have this same historical connection with the sugar industry of the 
nineteenth century (Commission on Cuba Affairs, 1935).10 
The centrales and control over investments. 
As we have argued, given the long-term interests of the mill, the management of the 
9 In the east, the lands were more often acquired first by the ~ and then leased to colonos sW 
central; although, sometimes they were acquired by a third party who would either lease them to the £m!!:!l 
or contract as a colono independiente -- though the number of colonos independientes is the east was 
inferior to that in the west. Many of the caneJands in the east were formerly occupied by open-range cattle 
grazing. See Guerra y Sanchez (1944), and Braga Brother Collection, Record Group 11, series lOa. Many 
of these lands in the east were purchased in large tracts in speculation immediately after the War of 
Independence and during the first U.S. occupation. See Perez (1988, 1986). 
10 "The degree to which these different field systems prevail on any given estate seems to depend 
chiefly on the original conditions of land tenure and the availability of cane. In the older provinces of the 
island there were a great many holdings, and with the reorganization of the sugar industry after the Ten 
Years War [1868-78] the owners of many of these planted cane to secure a cash crop. Many centrales are 
the result of a concentration about a single producing unit of a number of old plantations. Many plantation 
'.-.. owners thus became colonos to large £entrales. ... With the rise of sugar production in the eastern end of 
the island in new areas another situation presented itself. Companies bought land in large tracts and found 
it convenient to grant much of it on lease to farmers and others with capital who undertook the work of 
clearing the land and assisted in recruiting the necessary field labor" (Commission on Cuba Affairs, 1935). 
12
 
~ had an incentive to control the cane production of these lands-to insure its supplies. 
Much of the control over investments in the canefields, assigned in the contract between the 
~ and the £Q!QnQ, was allocated to the~. The contractual mechanism by which the 
~ maintained control of its investments was similar to what Cheung (1969) finds in Chinese 
sharecropping arrangements and Reid (1973) finds in the arrangements of the V.S. post-Civil War 
South. The ~ administration maintained control of all major investment and production 
decisions by the specific terms of the agreement, the duration of which was usually 6 to 10 years ­
- corresponding roughly to the lives of the canefields. The contract both established specific 
requirements of the ~ for the regular delivery of cane assignments to the mill during the 
grinding season, and it also set up specific obligations for the development of canefields and other 
capital improvements to be made on the colonia. 
The standard procedure of the centrales was to write up a contract in which the terms 
offered to the £QlQnQ were rather stringent, and then the degree to which this contract could be 
altered in individual negotiations depended on the strength of the bargaining position of the 
~. In general, the capital investments to be made were specified in the contract. The 
proportion of acres to be planted in cane -- a capital investment -- and other "minor" crops was 
strictly specified. l1 Additionally, the ~ reserved the discretion to determine how, where 
and when the cane plantings were to be laid out in the colonia. The £Q!QnQ was given the 
obligation to construct or maintain other capital goods on the colonia such as wells, cane-loading 
machines to load cane from the ox-carts to the rail cars, scales, housing for laborers, etc. If the 
11 For example, the Central Manati required the colono to plant 90 percent of the lands in cane, and 
the rest were to be devoted to crops and grassland to support inputs in cane production. The basic contract 
does not SClem to have varied greatly from central to central, although, as we shall see, variations according 
to the capital inputs and bargaining power of the colono were common. Braga Brothers Collection, series 
IOc, box 17, f. 9; and series IOc, box 27, f. 20. A similar standard contract, of the Central Oriente, was 
published in an appendix of Guerra y Slinchez (1944). 
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~ deemed the kQ1Q.nQ negligent in these responsibilities, it reserved the right to intervene to 
fulfill them at the ~'s expense. There were also numerous restrictions placed on the W,nQ's 
productive activities during the grinding season which controlled the flow of the services of these 
capital investments during harvest; for example, the ~ determined the timing of cutting of all 
canefields on the colonia. These restrictions on the investment activities of colonos all illustrate 
the interest of the ~ in maintaining very strict control over the activities in the canefields to 
maintain coordination and synchronization with the needs of the mill. Under such contractual 
terms, the ~ £W ~ had little control over the major decisions regarding the level of 
production and investment on the colonia. However, the degree of control which the ~ 
could maintain differed depending on whether the kQ1Q.nQ was dependent or independent of the 
~ for the provision of land and other capital. 
The ~ ~~ was typically dependent on the central not only for the land but 
also for advances of credit to carry out the terms of the contract, and the colonia was likely his 
only source of income; hence his very weak bargaining position. It was another matter in the case 
of the colonos independientes. They often owned large tracts of land and had a number of 
sources of income. In many cases they held contracts to supply cane to more than one ~ 
simultaneously. They often contracted with subcolonos rather than managing them directly, and 
in many cases they managed their colonias absentee. The large colonos were often in much better 
positi9ns to negotiate more favorable terms for themselves. Most important, as the owners of the 
land, they retained the property rights to their land at the termination of the contract, and they 
often were able to obtain the property rights to the capital improvements on the colonia, as well, 
at the termination of the contract. This question of the turnover of property rights of the cane 
supply infrastructure at contract termination created a fundamental difference from the point of 
view of the ~ in the attractiveness of the two types of colonos. 
14 
The retention of the property by the &Q1.QnQ indtmendiente greatly affected the terms of 
contract renegotiations. To connect the canefields to the mill, the ~ constructed railroad 
feeder lines to the colonias. If the property of the colonja was large enough, a railroad would 
have had to be run into it to make the cane accessible to the mill. The fixed investment in the 
railroad committed the ~ in the long term to the lands of that colonia. If that property was 
owned by the ~, a bilateral relationship was established between the &Q).Q!1Q and the ~, 
and consequently, the central had to renegotiate on much more equal terms when the contract was 
up for renewal. This explains the rising share of the colonias ~ 1Qs centrales which we observe 
in the data of Table 3. The relative attractiveness of the colonias ~ 1Qs centrales to the centrales 
was their relatively weak bargaining position during renegotiation. 
Another important feature of the bargaining relationship between the &Q).Q!1Q independiente 
and the central was the access of the £Q1QnQ independiente to the public railway system.12 
Virtually ail of the centrales depended in part on private rail lines to transport their cane to their 
mills; however, the degree of that dependence varied. Some depended exclusively on private 
lines, and others combined the use of public and private rail systems. In many cases the large 
colonia was a tract of land located adjacent to a public railroad. When a colonia was established, 
the ~ would construct a siding or a private feeder line connecting to the public line to obtain 
access to the canelands in the colonia. During the harvest, the ~ would combine the use of 
its private lines in the colonia and the public railway to ship the cane of the colonia to be ground. 
This connection with the public railway could have been of great strategic advantage to the 
£Q1QnQ. If the ~ owned the land, and if the ownership of the private railroad on his property 
12 The ·public· railroads in Cuba were those which offered freight and passenger services to the 
general public, as opposed to ·private" railroads owned by private (mostly sugar) companies which 
employed them exclusively for their own enterprises. All railroads were privately owned, although heavily 
regulated. 
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reverted to him at the termination of the contract, then the bargaining position shifted abruptly in 
his favor. The access of his cane lands to the public rail system opened his land up for 
competition with nearby mills during contract renegotiation. This, of course, strongly affected the( 
terms of the renegotiation because it broadened the options open to the kQJ.QnQ inde.Qendjepte. 
Anecdotal evidence of this dynamic in contract renegotiations is readily found. In correspondence 
of mill managers, one finds cases in which managers expressed concern about upcoming 
renegotiations with large colonos independieptes because the ownership of the rail feeder lines, 
sidings, along with telephone lines, scales and other equipment reverted to the~, who would 
threaten to contract with a neighboring mills unless a higher liquidation rate (the rate of exchange 
of sugar for cane) were offered (Braga Brothers Collection, series IOc; box 23, f. 62; box 69, f. 
25). 
The presence of this dynamic in the bargaining process created regional differences in the 
relative bargaining positions of centrales and the colonos independjentes across Cuba. First, 
colonos independientes were concentrated in the western part of the island. Second, the public 
railroad system was much denser in the western part of the island.I3 The relatively dense 
public railroad system in the west offered the larger ~ independiente a means of obtaining 
better a bargaining position and better contractual terms because access to the railroad could 
13 The public rail network had been developed much more thoroughly and its configuration was much 
denser in the western part of the island. The first railroad built on the island, begun in 1834, extended 
from the western port of Havana inward. From that point railroad expansion proceeded at a rapid pace to 
open up the western interior to sugar production. The major part of the rail network in the west was built 
in the nineteenth century with the aim of connecting the numerous small jnKenios to the ports. That 
construction resulted in a relatively dense layout of public railroads by the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In contrast, in the east most of the public railroad lines were few and widely separated. 
Construction of public railroads continued in the east as well as the west in the twentieth century. But 
centrales in the east depended much more on private plantation rail systems to obtain their cane supplies. 
Preference for private railroads increased after 1902, when private railroad operation was deregulated by the 
U.S. occupational government. In 1913, the density of public railroads (km. railroad per square km. land) 
in the west was about three times that of the east, and in 1930 it was still twice that of the east (Zanetti and 
Garc{a, 1987; Guerra y Sanchez, 1944). 
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provide alternative cane buyers with whom he could contract. In the east where public rail roads 
were sparse and crossed few canelands, the ~ administration could reduce the bargaining 
positions of the colonos by building relatively isolated private rail networks that connected only 
minimally if at all with the public railroads. Once the ~ had established relations with one 
mill, his access to the cane demands of other mills was reduced. Thereby an effective 
monopsonistic relationship was established between the ~ and the ~ (Guerra y S1nchez, 
1944). In the west, this strategy was not so easily adopted, given the land requirements of the 
new techniques, because the land was too closely interwoven with public railroads. 14 
From these arguments, we hypothesize that the prevalence of colonos independientes, and 
the local densities of competing sugarmills and public railroad branches affected the ease with 
which a mill could adopt the newest techniques, which implied a large scale of production. 
Historical factors that affected the locations, the infrastructure, and the institutional settings of 
mills created differences in the relative attractiveness to potential investors of different mill 
locations. Cane costs were the largest component of the unit costs in the accounts of the 
centrales; therefore, the relatively weaker bargaining positions in which the centraJes found 
themselves in the west inhibited their abilities to attract investors because preferable alternatives, 
14 The problem in the west--from the 9m!m!'s point of view--of the presence of a dense public rail 
network might have been overcome by building bridges that crossed but did not connect with the public rail 
lines. However, the building of bridges was not permitted by the regulatory authority. The regulations 
established by the occupational government of 1902 gave the Railroad Commission considerable authority 
over the crossing of any two railroads, whether public or private, and policy of the Commission was to 
require that whenever a private line crossed a public line it become a public railroad, i.e. that it was 
required to provide general serVices to the public and was subject to the regulation of the Railroad )Commission as a public railroad. Private railroads were allowed to connect to, but Dot to cross, the public 
lines. Braga Brothers Collection, series lOc, boxes 67-73, contains numerous references to this regulation. 
The regulations for both public and private railroads are recorded in the Civil Report of Major 
General Leonard Wood (1902). The regulations imposed by General Wood during the military occupancy 
were Dot easy to alter. The Platt Amendment to the new constitution of the new republic, known for giving 
the United States the right to intervene militarily in Cuban affairs for -the maintenance of a stable 
Government adequately protecting the life, property and individual liberty, - also provided that all -Acts of 
the United States in Cuba [ratified] during its military occupancyW would be wmaintained and protected. W 
See Perez (1990). 
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given the new technological system and the historical factors, could be found in abundance in the 
c east. We now turn to provide evidence for this hypothesis - that these regional or structural 
factors were capable of hindering the growth of mills to the optimal larger scales of production. 
( 11. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. 
The approach we follow is a fixed effect analysis of the structural factors in which we 
isolate and examine econometrically the composite influences of structural factors on the 
expansion of mill capacities. The data used to perform the estimations are a panel of 130 Cuban 
sugarmills observed over a period of 13 years, 1917-29. These data are sufficiently detailed to 
allow us to model the investment decision of the sugarmills with some care. A two step 
c	 procedure will be used to perform the analysis. First, we estimate the fixed effects by specifying 
and estimating a model of the decision to invest in greater mill capacity. The estimated fixed 
effects offer summary statistics for the investment behavior of each mill which are controlled for 
('	 time-variant effects, such as changes in market conditions or technical incentives. Hence, the 
statistical information included in these fixed effects is the influence of the remaining, time­
invariant factors. These can be thought of as an indicator of the composite structural features of 
each mill -- both observable and unobservable. 
Estimating the fixed effects and then examining them is superior to including a number of 
dummy variables to account for the observable structural effects for two reasons. By differencing 
the data properly, estimation biases caused in OLS regressions by omitting unobserved 
explanatory variables can be eliminated using the fixed effects model and the CVE estimator. 
Also, the estimated fixed effects offer a summary of the discrete annual investments of a single 
mill stretching over a period of several years. Obtaining this summary of behavior over several 
years reduces the variation in the sample due simply to differences in the points of time at which 
c 
( 
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different mills choose to invest. IS 
) 
Specification of the investment decision. 
With the diffusion of new techniques and larger scales of production, a huge range of 
variation in the capacities of mills existed in Cuba. Much of this variation in the scale of 
production can be explained by rational investment behavior without any appeal to differences in 
structural features. The variation in the scales of production reflected both time-variant and time­
invariant influences. The time-variant factors were derived from vintage effects in the investment ) 
Iin new machinery that caused delays in the adoption of new techniques, and from sensitivity of the 
investment decision to markets for investment equipment and other inputs. These were short-term 
or medium-term influences which caused capacities of mills to change gradually over time and 
also caused the rate of change to depend on market-based fluctuations in investment costs. The 
time-invariant influences were derived from the prevalence of relatively permanent structural 
features of the mills that affected the long-term costs of maintaining the capital investments in the 
canefields. These influences were site-specific differences that caused producers to have different 
long-run expected cane costs. 
We have shown elsewhere that much of the variation in the capacities of mills as well as , ) 
their patterns of growth can be explained by vintage capital effects with high adjustment costs to 
investment (Dye, 1991). The evolution of mill capacities in the industry exhibited a pattern of 
change similar to the Salterian "moving equilibrium" of vintage-capital models (Salter, 1960). u 
IS Mills had a long-term investment outlook which was not necessarily revealed by their investment 
behavior in anyone year. Adjustment costs imposed restrictions on investment behavior that caused mills to 
take time at reaching the optimal scale of production. Fluctuations in prices and uncertainties about market 
conditions also caused constant revision of investment goals. Therefore, although each investment decision 
had a long-term outlook, the decision itself to invest in a single year and its statistical manifestation was a 
short-term, discrete event. The discreteness of year-by-year decisions to expand the mill capacity 
introduced an element of discontinuity into the annual series of data that record the expansion of the 
capacities of individual mills. Because of discontinuities in the behavior of mill capacity expansion, to 
compare· the long-tennbehavior of different mills, we need a way to summarize the decisions of each mill , ) 
management over a period of several years. The fixed effects provide this summary. ~I 
I 
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Much of the technology that was being adopted was capital-embodied - improvements in 
machinery, and mechanization of transportation and conveyance of materials within the factories; 
(' 
'- . so the incentives for a given ~ to adopt improvements depended on a comparison of the 
productivity that the new technology could offer relative to the productivity offered by the 
technological vintage of the existing plant, given that fixed costs in the existing plant were sunk. 
Because the vintages of machinery varied between mills, the points in time at which they were 
willing to respond to invest in any recent improvements varied as well. But more importantly, the 
fluctuation in the markets for sugar and for investment inputs dictated that the timing of 
investment was affected by changes in market prices from year to year. By taking explicit 
account of these influences in the model of the investment decision, we control empirically for 
these market influences, separate them from the site-specific, structural differences between mills, 
and focus on the structural differences. 
To specify the investment decision we must direct a few words toward the definition of a 
"vintage" in the model. It is customary in theoretical literature to treat the vintage of a plant as 
fixed once the physical investment is made. This simplification, however, is not directly 
applicable empirically to Cuban sugarmills. The capital-embodied improvements of pieces of 
equipment within the mill were permissible and common. There were many performance-
t .,\ improving modifications in the designs of individual pieces of equipment which could have been 
introduced in existing plants without encountering problems of compatibility of old and new 
equipment (Frankel, 1955). Therefore, in general, improvements in the factories implied 
replacement of pieces of machinery but not of the entire plant. For example, grinding mills 
received a number of design modifications that increased their resistance to stress, and these new 
designs could be easily introduced into the grinding plant component by component as desired 
c (Deerr, 1911, 1950; Braga Brothers Collection, series lOa, 10c). 
The adoption of the new technologies required larger scales of production, but because of 
high adjustment costs, managers were not able to adopt the larger optimal scales of production 
,"
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immediately. However, managers could gradually expand their scales of production over time, 
adding new equipment piece by piece, with the aim of eventually reaching the optimal scale of 
production. To use one important series of technical improvements as an example, the lengths of 
tandems (number of rollers in the grinding mill)16 increased over the period. Extensions were 
made to the tandem by adding trapiches (3-roller mill units). Lengthening the tandem in this 
manner was not simply an intensification of the capital input of the grinding process. It also )' 
increased the capacity of the grinding process and, consequently, required an increase in the 
capacity of the entire mill. Extensions to the tandem could be made by adding a trapiche of the 
latest design, and, either at the same time or at a later date, the outmoded trapjches could be ) 
I 
updated or replaced. This behavioral choice applied as well to the equipment of other processes 
in the mill -- evaporating equipment, railroad and other transport equipment. 
The implication for modeling investment is that managers must be allowed to choose 
between expanding the capacity of the mill, to approach the long-run optimal scale, and replacing 
the outmoded equipment in the mill. To do this, we assign a vintage to each machine in the plant, 
rather than to the entire plant, and assume that the vintage of the plant (mill) can be described as a 
weighted average of the vintages of all the machines in the mill. Both replacing outmoded 
equipment and expanding mill capacity required the purchase of new mill equipment; but 
expansion of capacity entailed additional costs to obtain other strictly complementary inputs-­ , ) 
complementary mill machinery, rail roads and canefields. Investment costs are specified 
accordingly as 
(1) ) 
where u is the purchases of new equipment measured in terms of the addition to the mill capacity
I 
16 The grinding mill consisted of a line of up to 18 rollers. but the mill machinery itself came in units 
of 3-roller mills, called trapiches, which followed a standardized design. The trapiches were interconnected 
by conveyor belts and other auxiliary equipment and called a "tandem." 
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that the new purchase was capable of providing, and 'I' is the purchase price per capacity unit of 
new mill equipment. The factor, P" is the proportion of that investment which went toward 
expanding the capacity of the mill, as opposed to replacing old equipment, and '2t is the 
additional costs of complementary factors associated with a unit expansion of the capacity of the 
mill. The function, h(P" ",), represents the adjustment costs to investment where the first and 
second derivatives with respect to both terms are positive (Eisner and Strotz, 1963; Lucas, 1967; 
Treadway, 1971). All are functions of the year, t. 
The problem faced by the ~ administration was to maximize the return to their 
investments. Given the available technologies, managers perceived an optimal amount of 
investment, an optimal amount of replacement of outmoded equipment, and therefore, an optimal 
mill capacity. But because of adjustment costs they could not arrive at the desired long-run mill 
capacity in a single year, so the decision variables available to the managers were (1) the 
purchases of new equipment each year, "" and (2) the proportion of that investment in new 
equipment which went toward expanding the scale of operation, p,. The rate of expansion of the 
mill capacity is i, = p,"" where x, is defined as the capacity of the mill, and i, is the time-rate 
of change in the production capacity of the mill. The investment problem is the following. 
'I 
max V = ![Tt, - 'I'"' - , 2t P,u, - h(P,,",)]e-ndt 
11,. ", (2)
't 
S.t. i = P,u, 
The term, Tt" is the operating profits of year t, or 
(3)ft, .. [P, - v(p,_l' x,_l' w,)] Y, 
where p, is the price of sugar, v(p'_l' x,_l' w,) is the unit operating (variable) costs, and y, is the 
level of sugar output. The vintage of the plant affected the investment decision through its effect 
on the unit operating costs, and new vintages of equipment improved the performance of mills by 
,r", 
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reducing the cane requirement. If the vintage of the mill was a weighted average of the vintages 
of its equipment, the vintage make-up of the mill is reflected in the unit cane requirement of the 
mill. I? Therefore, the unit cane requirement of the mill can be used as an indicator of the 
vintage make-up of the mill. The scale of production is also included as an argument of unit 
operating costs to capture scale effects on unit operating costs. Therefore, we assume the unit 
operating costs, v, are a function of the unit cane requirement of the equipment already existing 
in the plant, P,_I; the existing capacity of the mill, X,_I; and the prices of variable inputs, w,. If 
the mill is producing at full capacity, y, =x" 
With these assumptions, a solution to the investment problem represented by equations (2) 
and (3) is of the form u· = UO(p x w 8 8) and n· n O X W ) and 
, '-I' '-I' " I" 2t t', • t' ( P,-I' '-I' " 81,' 82t ' 
the optimal miJI expansion is 
.. n0 (4)x, = "" u, 0 = 
17 The history of choices between replacing outmoded equipment and expanding mill capacity is 
reflected in the weighted average. If the mill manager could choose to apply new investment either lo 
replace old equipment or to expand the capacity of the mill, the new vintage which was introduced will have 
had a different contribution to the average cane requirement of the mill depending on whether the 
investment was applied to expanding the capacity of the mill or replacing existing equipment. New vintages 
of equipment improved the performance of the mill by reducing the cane requirement. However, each mill 
was composed of many machines of various vintages. If the average cane requirement of the mill was a 
weighted average of the vintages of equipment in the mill, the introduction of a machine of the latest vintage 
increased the average cane requirement according to the following expression. 
P'_IX,_I + P~u, - (1- P,)p~u, 
P, = 
x, 
N 
where P, is the average unit cane requirement of the mill in year t , P, is the marginal cane requirement 
contributed by a unit of the latest vintage of equipment, and P: is the marginal unit can~ requirement of a 
unit of old equipment that is being retired and replaced by new equipment. The term P, u,/ x, represents 
the contribution of the investment in new equipment to the average cane requirement at the mill 
(P~ :s; P,), and the term [(1 - P,) P:u,l/ x, represents the reduction (improvement) in the average cane 
requirement due lo the withdrawal of old, outmoded equipment. If all investment in year t went loward 
expansion of the capacity of the mill, rather than replacement of outmoded equipment, then 1 - P, = 0, 
and the reduction of the average unit cane requirement, P" is less than it would have been if sonte of the 
old equipment had been replaced, since no old equipment was retired. 
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The econometric model with fixed structural effects. 
We estimate equation (4) in the form 
(5) 
c 
where all symbols represent the log forms of the variables defined above (the subscripts i and t 
represent mill i and year t), q, is a vector the logs of annual market prices-time- variant, but 
'-.. 
individual-invariant. The mu is a vector of cane qualities-the logs of the percent sucrose and 
water contents of the cane juice. IS The variations in weather and soil quality were transmitted 
to the mill through their effects on the quality of the cane; therefore, these variables capture the 
variations of soil qualities and weather conditions at each mill which may have affected their 
investment decisions. The %/ are the individual fixed effects, to be treated as unobserved. Not all 
are unobservable; however, there were many influential individual characteristics that cannot be 
(. 
'-. .. 
observed. These would include such effects as the managerial experience, information flows, and 
the access of each mill to credit markets in North America. Because some important time­
invariant factors are unobservable, we treat the composite structural effects as unobservable, 
estimate their influences, and then we attempt to sort out some of the components of the estimates 
using the individual structural characteristics that we can observe. 
The specification bias that might otherwise enter as an effect of unobserved variables is 
c 
18 The dependence of the Cuban sugar industry on its unusually favorable soils was welllcnown. The 
different soils on the island were also known to have different qualities that affected the cane crop. Also, 
the amount and timing of rainfall and sunshine affected the cane crop, which varied from year to year. The 
primary way that weather and soil conditions entered the production outcome was through their effects on 
the quality of the cane delivered to the mill. Therefore, accounting for the quality of the cane entering each 
mill each year accounts for time-variant effects on investment decisions at each mill that were related to 
weather and soil variability. Fortunately, we have excellent measures of the qualities of cane entering each 
of the mills each year, published by the Secretaria de Agricultura, Comercio, y Trabajo, taken from the lab 
reports of the mills. Of the variables employed in the regression, the sucrose content of the cane juice, is 
taken·· directly from the reports, and the water content of the cane juice is calculated using a chemical model 
of cane composition that employs the routine measurements taken in the mill laboratories of that time, 
included in the reports of the Secretaria de Agricultura, Comercio, y Trabajo (1916/17-1929). These 
measures are discussed in greater detail in Dye (1991). S.a. Prinsen Geerligs (1917) and Robertson (1934). 
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eliminated by taking differences of the observed variables from their individual-means (the means 
of each individual mill taken by averaging yearly observations across time). We obtain a sample 
mean of aB variables in equation (5) for each of the mills to obtain 
(6) 
where i indexes each mill in the sample. Then we subtract equation (6) from equation (5). The 
individual fixed effects. Y,%,. are canceled and drop from the equation. We then estimate all the 
coefficients except Y, using the covariance estimator (CVE) (Hsiao. 1986). After these 
coefficients are estimated we obtain estimates of the fixed individual effects. Y'%j' which are 
interpreted. similarly to dummy variables, as shift factors in the constant term. 
The data. 
The data needed for estimating equation (5) include mill capacities. yields. cane qualities. 
and market prices. The data for the mill capacities. yields and cane qualities are taken from a 
panel which includes most of the mills operating in Cuba for a period of thirteen years. 1917­
1929; that number ranged between 163 and 198 mills. In the regression. we limit attention to 
those mills that were in operation throughout the entire period in order to eliminate the mills that 
failed some time during the period. Their failure may reflect unsound investment practices. and 
there is no way of accounting for such behavior in the model. In symmetry, we eliminate the 
mills which entered the industry sometime during the period of observation as well. Since the 
data are at the plant level, whether the entering mill belonged to an old or a new firm might have 
affected investment behavior and the returns to investment through the experience of the owners 
) 
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and managers. 19 
These exclusions render a sample of 130 mills for 12 years, when lags in the model are 
accounted for. However, some of the mills failed to file complete reports of their factory data, so 
the panel is made incomplete by missing observations. In the results below, two estimates of 
equation (5) are presented, one based on the larger sample of 130 mills which form an incomplete 
panel of 1473 observations and a second based on the smaller sample of 71 mills which forms a 
complete panel of 852 observations. We will refer below to the larger sample as the "full 
sample" and the smaller sample as the "limited sample." The statistical properties are the same 
for the covariance estimation of the incomplete panel and the complete panel since the missing 
observations are randomly missing, as long as the error terms are distributed independently 
c 
between mills (Hsiao, 1986). The advantage of the complete panel is that equal amounts of 
information are provided from each mill and each year, but in the complete panel the number of 
degrees of freedom is reduced. 
c 
As regards capturing the influences of market prices in the investment decision, price 
expectations play an important role. In the decision model formulated in equations (2) and (3), 
the prices that enter the decision through operating profits, 1t" are dominated by the managers' 
19 The unit of observation is the mill rather than the finn. Some firms owned a number of mill in 
different locations. However, many firms only owned one mill. The decentralization of mill ownership on 
the island remained relatively high compared with other sugar islands in the Caribbean, due probably only 
to the relative size of Cuba's land area. 
The presence of marginal mills operating in the short run in the sugar industry is an interesting 
occurrence and important not to overlook. Due to the low capital costs of restarting with the cane (rawons) 
standing in the fields, many small, obsolete mills which had shut down could maintain the option of re­
entering production in years of high sugar prices or low labor costs. Consequently, in favorable years there 
were a number of milIs grinding cane using techniques (machinery) that could not have covered operating 
costs in more ordinary market conditions. A discussion of the behavior of these "primitive" mills, as they 
were calIed by contemporaries, is found in the trade sugar journal, Sugar 23 Jan. 1921, pp. 1-2. Sugar 
producers made the observation that these marginal mills had a stabilizing effect on sugar prices by 
providing additional production capacity in the industry when prices were high, thus they had an offsetting 
effect on the price in years when it was rising. From the beginning of World War I to 1925 sugar prices 
were abnormally high, and so there were many marginal milIs in operation during the period of 
investigation. 
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expectations of future prices. As always, price expectations are tricky, but in this case they are 
especially so because we are dealing with a period of wartime/post-wartime price adjustment. 
Sugar prices were subjected to the abnormalities of commodities supplies during World War I, 
two years of price controls and, at their removal, speculation over the sugar price. Producers 
understood that the high sugar prices of World War I were abnormal, and for the purposes of 
their long-term investment plans, they would not have formed expectations of future sugar prices 
adaptively on wartime prices, which were at a level clearly unsustainable in peacetime. What 
their expectations were is hard to know, but it is not difficult to arrive at a plausible pattern of 
expectations. From 1903 to 1914, the sugar price had remained relatively stable. The price of 
Cuban sugars in New York, c. & f. net of duties, fluctuated between 2 and 3 cents per pound. In 
1916, the sugar price reached abnormally high levels of above 5 cents. In 1918 and 1919, 
international price control agreements maintained these abnormal prices. Then in 1920, when the 
price controls were lifted a speculative bubble occurred, known as "the Dance of the Millions," in 
which the price rose as high as 22.5 cents per pound then fell to 3.75 cents all in the same 
season.20 The average price of sugar for the year 1920 was 400 percent higher than the prewar 
level. (See Figure 3.) The abnormal prices of 1916 to 1920 would not have entered into the 
managers' calculations of long-term price expectations. Given the stability of prices for the 
decade and a half before the war and given the lack of any other information about sugar price 
expectations, it is plausible to assume that during, the period of high wartime prices, managers 
believed that in the long run the sugar price would return to its prewar level. There is also 
20 Many sugar producers were ruined at the end of the speculation because the producers were storing 
their stocks of sugar, holding out for higher prices, when the price plummeted. This also resulted in a 
crisis in the banking industry in Cuba in which many Cuban and Spanish banks on the island failed. Of the 
three leading banks in Cuba, the Banco Nacional and the Banco Intemacional went bankrupt, and the Banco 
Espaiiol was severely hurt. North American banks, the National City Bank and the Royal Bank of Canada 
suddenly replaced these Cuban and Spanish houses as the leading banks in the country (P~rez 1986; Jenks, 
1928). These North American banks (also included were Chase National and Guaranty Trust) opened many 
branches during World War I, and were indeed heavily exposed to Cuban sugar when the bubble burst. 
They continued to meet depositors' demands to withdraw funds by tapping the funds of their Head Offices 
(Cleveland and Huertas, 1985). 
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r
' .. anecdotal evidence to support this assumption.21 
As a further consideration, keeping the specification of price expectations simple is 
essential for the econometric model because there is a strict upper limit to the number of time­
( variant, individual-invariant explanatory variables that can be included. Given only twelve years 
of observation, inclusion of twelve or more time-variant, individual-invariant variables introduces 
strict multicollinearity in the matrix of explanatory variables and singularity of its cross-products 
c matrix. The most attractive simple approximation is to assume a constant level for the expected 
long-term price of sugar over the period. This specification can account for an aspect of price 
expectations that is commonly overlooked in econometric models. Different managers may have 
( been more or less optimistic in their assessments of the future sugar price. The fixed effects will 
pick up any differences of this sort between individual mills. Though we cannot observe the 
differences, there is no danger of bias entering the estimated coefficients through not having 
c controlled for them explicitly. 
We must also consider the short-term effects of the high wartime prices on the sugar 
market. It is possible that investors would have wished to take advantage of short-term high 
prices to accumulate capital because the capital expenditures could have been written off quickly. 
However, it is also possible that the uncertainty introduced in the long-run price due to wartime 
price controls, speculation, and the general disruptive effects of the war may have had a stronger 
influence that offset the former. The higher level of uncertainty would have had the effect of 
reducing the level of investment as producers postponed improvements of their mills until 
conditions in the market settled down (Hey, 1979, 1984). To capture these influences, we include 
a dummy variable, the "war dummy," which is defined to be equal 1 during the years 1917-20. 
21 After the war, there is evidence of belief among Cuban sugar producers that the price would 
fluctuate throughout the rest of the decade around a level not too much different from the prewar levels. 
Manuel Rionda, who was the president of the sugar brokerage firm, Czarnikow-Rionda, which at one time 
handled over 60 percent of Cuban sugar sales in New York, wrote in personal correspondence as late as 
1929 that he expected a recovery in the price of sugar. Such comments are found in the private letterbooks 
of Manual Rionda. See the Braga Brothers Collection, series 2. 
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Regarding the input prices that figure into operating costs, expectations of future prices 
are treated in a similar manner to expectations of the price of sugar. However, current variable 
input prices are included among the explanatory variables because they also affected the costs of 
investment. The investments in the fields required largely unskilled labor for establishing 
canefields, and building railroads and bridges. We employ the wages of cane cutters to represent 
the cost of unskilled labor in the fields.22 The price of steel rails and an index of the price of 
sugarmill machinery is included among the explanatory variables to represent the material and 
equipment costs of railroad and mill construction. The price of bituminous coal for fueling the 
boilers is included to represent the cost of fuel at the mill. The mills generally were fueled by 
bagasse (cane trash) supplemented with coal, wood or fuel oil. The bagasse was a by-product of 
sugar production. The cost of wood was primarily the labor cost of gathering it. Because the use 
of fuel oil was being newly introduced in Cuban sugarmills, the sales price of oil in Cuba was out 
of line with international oil prices and were not representative of the long-run cost of adopting oil 
22 The liquidation rates of colon05 for deliveries of cane--the payment to the colonos in sugar for each 
100 arrobas of cane delivered to the mill--have been examined but are not included among the explanatory 
variables in the regression for two reasons. Unfortunately, we have average liquidation rates for only a few 
mills. Liquidation rates relevant to the investment decision would have differed considerably from mill to 
mill depending on the age and expiration dates of their contracts with their colonos. The liquidation rates 
were fixed in the contracts, which were of six to ten years duration; therefore, the fluctuation of the rates 
was restricted by the expiration and renewal of contracts. The average liquidation rates paid by mills could 
not generally respond to fluctuations in the market for sugar or for cane. There were other means 
employed by mill managers to provide incentives for short nm responses in cane supply, but these expenses 
were determined by the cost of labor. The primary means was the use of credit advances both for planting 
and for maintenance of canefields. When managers wished to stimulate cane production in the short run, 
they intensified the maintenance of the canefields to increase the yields per acre of cane. Advances of this 
sort were typically tied to a specific cultivation or planting task; so to intensify maintenance, they simply 
increased the number of tasks they fmanced. The amount of each advance was determined by the cost of 
performing the particular task required. Since these tasks were labor-intensive, changes in costs of this sort 
are reflected in the wages of field labor. 
I have been able to construct a time series of liquidation rates that would apply reasonably well to 
mills in eastern Camagiiey province and western Oriente. These demonstrate that here was a rising trend in 
the liquidation rates in the area around eastern Camagiiey and western Oriente. This trend would need to be 
accounted for in the investment decision. The trend likely was a general trend on the island, so the 
available data for liquidation rates though limited might be useful for representing the general trend. 
However, the series of liquidation rates is severely coUinear with the war dummy and the wage for cutting 
cane. Given this, we have excluded the liquidation rates from the regression. understanding that any 
influence of the rising trend in liquidation rates is picked up by the cutting wages and the war dummy. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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as a fuel (Republica de Cuba, Secretar{a de Hacienda, 1917-29b).23 Changes in the price of 
c 
coal, its closest substitute, were more representative of the changes in relative costs of using each 
of the supplementary fuels. All the factor prices are scaled for changes in the general level of 
prices using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics wholesale price index (1890-1930). The ties of 
c: 
Cuban sugar producers to the U.S. markets for producers goods was very close. Mills depended 
on imports of machinery, fuel and capital. The Cuban peso was tied one-to-one to the dollar, and 
U.S. currency circulated in Cuba. Given the ties of Cuban sugar producers to the U.S. markets 
c 
for imports of most factors of prOduction, this is the best available measure of general fluctuations 
in prices. 
The regression estimates. 
The regression estimates are presented in Table 4. The overall fit of the regression model 
is very good for both full and limited sample estimates. The F-ratio for both is significant at all 
reasonable levels of significance. The signs and significance of the estimated coefficients follow a 
priori expectations, except for the lagged yield. 
Among the input prices multicollinearity is present, so it is inaccurate to draw conclusions 
about their significance using the individual tests. Joint tests of significance based on comparison 
of restricted and unrestricted models, presented in Panel B of Table 4, show that the input prices 
are jointly significant with the cutting wages and the war dummy. The presence of 
muIticollinearity, of course, presents no problem since we are not attempting to distinguish or 
23 The use of fuel oil in sugannills in Cuba was first introduced in the midst of our sample period. 
One observes that the prices of fuel oil imported from the United States reported in Comercio Exterior are 
much lower than the price of fuel oil in the United States in the first few years after it began to be reported 
in Cuban trade statistics. The apparent reason for the lower price is that a portion of the payment for fuel 
oil by those innovators who first adopted it was made in other forms. Those who first used fuel oil in the 
mill also founded oil distributing companies at Cuban ports as subsidiaries of major U.S. oil companies. 
The agreements they made with mother companies to establish distribution facilities in the country very 
likely included remuneration in terms of discounts on oil purchases in exchange for capital investments 
designed to open the Cuban fuel oil market. Braga Brothers, series lOco 
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separate the influences of these prices. Furthermore. the statistical insignificance of the prices of J! 
non-Iabor investment inputs - and even the positive signs on the coefficients ­ is not unexpected 
theoretically given the pattern of complementarity between the inputs in investment. Investment in 
canefields required primarily labor input. but investment in rail roads and mill equipment required 
the combination of material inputs with labor (steel rails or equipment). Steel rails could be 
purchased but were of little use without employing labor to install them. Given the presence of 
this complementary relationship in railroad and mill construction between material and labor 
inputs. the estimated coefficients absorb the influence of cross-price effects. If the price of steel 
rails and wages move in opposite directions. the own-price effect of steel rails on investment will 
be offset by the cross-price effect of wages on railroad construction. Meanwhile. at the same ) 
time. the own-price effect of wages on canefield development is not offset by the movement in the 
cost of steel rails. This result is derived from the cost structure developed above in equation 
(1).24 
The sign on the coefficient of the war dummy is negative. This result suggests that the 
uncertainties of World War I and its aftermath tended to discourage mill expansion and/or the new 
banking environment of Cuba in the twenties. with greater North American presence. was ) 
stimulative to the growth in mill capacities. It turned out that after the bubble of 1920. sugar 
where 1t2 z' E 
1t1 
24 This result follows directly from the investment cost structure we developed above. Cf. equation 
(1). Consider the function of net returns to investment, F III 1t[xp z(x2 )] - W1(Xl + ~) - W2 z(X:J, 
where 1t is a function of returns to investment which is convex in order to exhibit diminishing returns to 
investment, and XI and Z are the labor and materials inputs (steel rails, etc.) obtained at prices 
wl (i = 1. 2). Because of complementarity, the labor input, XI (i III 1. 2), enters both directly in the 
function, 1t, and indirectly through the material inputs, Z III Z(X2) , since the materials must be combined 
with labor in order to be useful. Necessary conditions for maximizing net returns to investment are 
1t2 z' III wl + w2 ' and 1t1 '" wl 
a1t d:z and 1t 1 !! 01t Because of diminishing returns, the derivatives of 1t2 z' and 
aZ ~' aXI 
with respect to ~ are negative. If wl and w2 move in opposite directions, the own-price effect of w2 on 
Z is offset by the complementary effect of wl on z. However. wl has an own-price effect, through XI' 
which is not offset. Consequently, we detect statistically the inverse relationship between wl and XI' but 
not that of w2 and z. 
) 
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properties fell into the hands of the North American banks because of foreclosures on bad debt. 
In many cases, they decided to maintain possession and continue to make investments in these 
properties at least for the short run hoping that the demand for sugar properties, affected adversely 
c 
by the uncertainty in the sugar price, would improve in the near future (Cleveland, 1985). 
The lagged mill capacity is highly significant. The expected sign is negative because the 
smaller the existing capacity of the mill, the greater are the potential economies of scale. This 
result may provide some corroboration that mills pursued larger scales as the constraint of costs of 
adjustment were relaxed in order to reap economies of scale. However, this result should be 
obtained regardless since xit - Xi,t-l and Xi,t-l are not independently constructed. The lagged 
c 
yield is mildly significant at the 0.1 level in the full sample, and insignificant in the limited 
sample, and as well, the signs of the coefficients alternate between the two sample estimates. One 
would expect the yield offered by the existing equipment to be smaller the older the vintage of the 
c 
mill because there would be a greater incentive for updating the equipment. However, the use of 
the lagged yield as a proxy for the vintage of the equipment is not reliable because of other factors 
which influence the yield, particularly weather conditions, which are highly stochastic and had a 
very strong influence on the yield. So the insignificance of the lagged yield probably arises 
because it is a poor proxy of the vintage of equipment at the mill. Finally, the sucrose and water 
contents of the cane are significant and exhibit the expected signs, since for a given weight of 
cane higher contents of sucrose and water in the cane juice indicate a lower impurity content. 
The fixed effects. 
The principal objective is to examine the correlation of the manager's propensity to 
expand the mill capacity with the structural features that might have affected the bargaining 
positions of colonos. To this aim, we focus on the correlation of the share of cane supplied by 
colonos independiemes at each mill with the estimated fixed effects. A negative correlation 
supports the hypothesis that the independent ~ was able at times to obtain a better bargaining 
~: 
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position vis-~-vis the central relative to the £Q!.QnQ ~~. To examine the correlations, we 
calculate estimates of the fixed effects based on the estimated covariance regression results 
presented in the previous section. Then we estimate a second regression using the estimated fixed 
effects as the dependent variable and the percentage of cane supplied by colonos ind~pendientes as 
a dependent variable. We also include a number of additional explanatory variables to control for 
other structural factors that might also have affected the magnitudes of the estimated fixed effects. 
Among the additional explanatory variables, we include a proxy for the orientation of each 
mill toward North American credit markets. A correlation of this variable with the fixed effects 
might indicate some imperfection in credit access; however, since the results we obtain offer no 
evidence regarding causation, we cannot conclude that credit imperfections existed. In fact, the 
orientation of the mills toward North America may be a indicator of other very important 
unobservables--the quality of management and technical skills, which were likely to have differed 
between mills; and the differences in tacit (internally learned) knowledge about the new techniques 
being used at each mill. Greater North American orientation can suggest greater access to 
markets for technical specialists or greater access to information about specialized labor markets in 
the United States. 
Estimates of the fixed effects are obtained from the estimated coefficients of the 
covariance regression and the individual-mill sample means of the explanatory variables in the 
regression. Define loll to be the fixed, individual mill effects, loll = YsInzj (notation of equation 
(5». We estimate loll with 
(7) 
where i indexes each mill. 
We estimate and analyze fixed effects obtained from the estimated coefficients of both the 
limited and full sample regressions. Comparison of the two sets of estimates lends confidence to 
.. ~ 
I 
J 
'J 
) 
J 
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the inferences because they are similar using either set. Because of .the lack of data of structural 
effects for some of the 71 mills in the limited sample, we have used the sample means of the full 
sample and the estimated coefficients of the limited sample to obtain the second set of fixed effects 
estimates in Table 5. Therefore, the estimated fixed effects from the full and limited sample 
regressions, used to obtain the results of Table 5, have the same number of observations (mills); 
the only difference between them is that they employ different estimates of the coefficients, V;, i 
= 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. This is a reasonable procedure since the purpose for using the second set of 
fixed effects estimates is to observe the sensitivity of the results to plausible variations in the 
estimated coefficients of Table 4 due to the effects of multicollinearity between the factor price 
variables. 
The correlations of the fixed effects estimated by 
where C/j is the percentage of cane supplied by to mill i by colonos independientes, CA.; is the 
percentage of cane supplied by the mill i administration, MA; is the number of other mills within 
a ten kilometer radius of mill i , RB; is the number of branches of public railroads within fifteen 
kilometers of mill i , ~ is the mean sucrose content in the cane juice of mill i for the seasons 
from 1917 to 1929, YC; is the yield of cane per acre of mill i in 1930, and OR; is a dummy 
representing the orientation of the mill toward North America. 
The fits of the estimated regressions, presented in Table 5, are good in both cases; the F­
ratio for each is significant at 0.01; and the signs of all the coefficients correspond with a priori 
expectations. Multicollinearity between explanatory variables is not a problem; all pairwise 
correlation coefficients between explanatory variables are less than 0.3. Examination using the 
characteristic roots test reveals no significant other linear combinations between explanatory 
variables. 
34 
To interpret the results, we focus initially on two variables both of which are statistically 
significant. (1) First is the percent share of cane supplied by colonos inde,pendientes, which is 
highly significant. This suggests that the greater the percentage of cane supplied by colonos 
independientes, the smaller was the long-run expected yearly rate of expansion of the capacity of 
the mill. This result corroborates our hypothesis that co]onos inde.pendientes indeed occupied 
bargaining positions which hampered the expansion of mills. Thus it supports the conclusions of 
the first section of the paper. The percent share of cane supplied by the ~ administration is 
also included but is found to be insignificant. The figures for both these variables are for the 
1930 crop.25 
(2) A dummy variable included to represent each mill's orientation towards North 
America is also highly significant. It attempts to capture any differences between mills due to 
their access to North American credit markets, access to managerial and technical information and 
support, or as well, any differences in the quality of management stemming from association with 
the North American business environment. Orientation towards North America is proxied by a 
list compiled in 1928 by the Sugar Club of Cuba (a mill owners' business and technical 
organization), which categorized mills by the national orientation of their business 
connections.26 The significance of this variable indicates that the connections with the United 
2S The data for these shares are of the 1930 crop obtained from the Secretarla de Agricultura, 
Comercio, y Trabajo, Industria Azucarera. 1930. Data for other years within the period are not available. 
Nonetheless, the end-period observation is the preferred one. The reason is that some mills that depended 
heavily on colonos independientes before World War I tended to reduce their dependence on colonos 
independientes as time progressed. If these mills could foresee their opportunities for reducing their 
dependence on colonos independientes, the end-period observation better represents their expectations. Of 
course, they could not have achieved significant reductions in the dependence of colonos independientes 
instantaneously because of contract duration, but they could, and in fact did, negotiate cane contracts in 
advance or concurrently with plans to expand mill capacity. 
26 Braga Brothers Collection, series IOc, box 61, f. 11. The list does not correspond to the 
nationalities of the owners of the mills. Most mills were incorporated, and their shareholders as well as 
their boards of directors consisted of people of different nationalities. Instead, the list classifies the 
nationalities of mills according to their connections to the business communities of either Cuba or the United 
States, as assessed by the members of the Sugar Club. A handful of the mills in the sample are not 
) 
) 
.. 'I 
, ./ 
) 
) 
i) 
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States were important for obtaining the resources needed for expanding to large-scale techniques. 
Whether the difference was in terms of credit access or management or technical skills or 
something else cannot be determined from these results. To compare the relative magnitudes of 
the effects of mill orientation and the prevalence of colonos independjentes, see note b in Table 5. 
(3) Two variables are included to account for the other mills in close proximity which 
provide feasible alternatives to the local colonos for establishing cane supply contracts. The 
number of mills within a ten kilometer radius of the mill in question is included to represent the 
presence of alternative mills in close proximity. Nearness was important because shipping the 
cane over larger distances was costly and perilous to the quality of the cane if it could not reach 
the alternative mill quickly enough or without interruption. The number of branches of public 
railroad lines which passed within fifteen kilometers of the mill is included to represent the access 
of the colonos to public railroads. The availability of public rail transportation to the colonos was 
necessary to allow them a means of transporting their cane quickly enough to an alternative mill 
site. These variables were based on figures for 1920.27 The insignificance of these variables 
indicates that there was considerable variation in the correlation of these variables with the 
expected yearly rate of expansion of the capacities of mills. The signs indicate that the proposed 
influence may still have existed, though it is not easy to capture statistically. 
(4) The mean sucrose content of each mill over the period 1917-29 is included to control 
for the quality of the soil of each mill's cane lands. Its significance indicates that variation in the 
expansion tendencies of different mills was related either to the composition of soils or to the 
included in this list. The orientation of these mills is determined by the country in which the sugar 
company was incorporated, which is obtained from the Secretaria de Hacienda, Industria Azucarera y sus 
Derivados (1928). 
27 The number of branches was entered as 0, I, 2, or 3. If more than three branches were near the 
mill, that observation of the variable was assigned a value of 3, in order not to place extremely high weights 
on portside mill sites. The data were obtained using maps of the Cuban sugar industry in 1920 published in 
the Secretaria de Agricultura, Comercio, y Trabajo, Industria Azucarera. 1919/20. 
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Jidepletion of the fertility of soils at various mills, which would have had an effect on the long-run I 
outlook of the mill's productive potential. 
(5) Cane yields per acre are included to control for differences between mills in the costs 
of cultivating cane. Cane yields could have affected the unit requirements of labor and other 
inputs in cane cultivation and delivery. If some mills had lower cane produetivities and a low 
elasticity of substitution between land and labor, unit labor costs on the colonia would have been 
higher and the prices demanded by colonos at these mills for supplying cane to the centrales might 
as well have been higher. This would imply higher costs.to these mills in obtaining the additional 
cane supplies needed upon expansion. If the differences in land produetivities affected the costs of 
production to the mill, investors may have chosen to invest in mills that had higher cane yields. 
If so, this might suggest an advantage to the eastern lands because there was much virgin land 
suited to cane available in the east but little remaining in the west.28 Land prices may have ) 
accounted for and offset some of these differences in fertility, but they would have accounted for 
the differences only imperfectly, particularly in cases where the land was purchased by the mill 
owners before it was put into cane, such that the actual productivity was not known. Cane yields, '\
; 
however, turn out to have an insignificant effect on mill expansion behavior. To be complete, the 
cane yields account for cost differences in cane cultivation related to the volume of cane obtained 
from a given amount of land. They do not account for the quality of cane, but the mean sucrose ) 
content of the cane juice controls for such variation in qual ity. 
As an additional comment, we have observed that the coefficient of the share of the cane 
supplied by the central administration is insignificant. This corresponds with our observation 
elsewhere that the larger centrales in Cuba seem to reveal a preference against integrating the cane 
)
28 The data used are the yields of cane per acre reported by the Secretaria de Agricultura, Comercio y 
Trabajo, Industria Azucarera. Memoria de la Zafra, in 1930. It is unfortunate that it is Decessary to use 
cane yields from 1930 rather than from the middle of our period. Cane yields were Dot collected OD an 
annual basis, and the year 1930 is the first year in which cane yield data are available after 1913. 
c 
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cultivation vertically with the sugar manufacturing activities (Dye, 1991). While we have not 
explained why this was the case, these results confirm that there was no significant statistical 
relationship between the vertical integration of cultivation and milling, and the tendencies of mills 
to expand their capacities. 
The results of these regressions suggest that the correlations of the estimated fixed effects 
with the observable structural features of mills conform to the pattern we have proposed. They 
show that there was an association between the mill's expansion and the prevalence of colonos 
independientes, thus they provide evidence to support the proposition that the colonos 
jndependientes could affect the contractual relationship sufficiently to discourage managers from 
expanding their mill capacities. The results also suggest that the influence of the orientation of 
mills toward North America was very strong and merits further attention. 
From this analysis, it is difficult to say exactly what the causal factors are that contribute 
to the influence of mill orientation. It is likely that this variable represents the variation of many 
factors related to information flows and personal contacts between Cuba and the United States. Its 
high degree of significance indicates the dependence of the Cuban sugar industry on the capital 
resources emanating from the United States. It is no surprise that the orientation of mills should 
have been so significant. Relying on these correlations, we cannot actually distinguish the mills' 
orientation towards North America from other factors that are highly correlated with it. An 
aspect of the ownership structure of mills--whether the mill was held by a company that controlled 
several mills--is highly positively correlated with the orientation of mills towards North America. 
The correlation between these two variables is 0.75.29 The significance, then, of the orientation 
29 Like the mill's orientation, we have defined the ownership structure variable as a dummy variable. 
The variable is assigned a value of 1 if the company that owned the mill in 1928 also owned other mills. 
This is also determined from the list compiled by the Sugar Club, see footnote 26. Though they are not 
reported, I calculated regressions that included an ownership structure dummy variable in place of the 
orientation variable. As one would expect, the results are virtually the same. 
~) 
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of mills toward North America may indicate organizational factors related to the upper 
management's investment decisions and international marketing abilities. While it is disheartening 
that the various influences involved here cannot be separated statistically, the result does strongly 
reflect the influences Chandler emphasizes in the development of U.S. and British industry during 
this period. And it suggests that the forces behind the growth, the technical change and the 
structural change in the Cuban sugar industry were related to the general developments in modem 
technology and business in the industrial countries in the early twentieth century. 
On the other hand, the influences that we observe of the colonos independjentes on the 
ease of adoption of larger scales of production suggest that their ability to bargain for more 
favorable terms in the cane supply contracts made expansion of mill capacity relatively costly. 
This influence was independent of the orientation of the mill. These regional differences between 
the east and the west that affected the institutional settings and the infrastructure of the mills 
created relative differences in the attractiveness of sugarmills from the points of view of 
) 
prospective investors. The foreign capital which flowed into Cuba was scarce and tended to flow 
to those areas of the island where the centrales found themselves in better position to maintain the 
capital invested in the cane supply networks with as little threat from local colonos independientes 
as possible. 
) 
I 
Table 1 
SUBar production per mill in Cuba, 1860-29. 
year mills grinding sugar produced sugar produced 
by all mills per mill 
(no.) (0005 of bags (0005 of baBs 
of325lbs.) of 325lbs.) 
1860 1365 2968 2.2 
1877 1190 3574 3.0 
1904 174 7253 41.7 
1916 189 21,063 111.4 
1929 163 35,540 218.0 
Sources. Republica de Cuba, Secretarfa de Hacienda (1903, 1916); Republica de Cuba, 
Secretarla de Agricultura, Comercio, y Trabajo (1929); Ferrara (1915): Pezuela (1863). 
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rTable 3. " 41 
Shares of cane supply (percent) supplied by each tenure arrangement. 
province 
All Cuba 
Pinar del Rio 
Habana 
"'"', 
Matanzas 
Santa Clara 
'" 
Camagiiey 
Oriente 
(fable continues next page.) 
year 
1905 
1913 
1929 
1905 
1913 
1929 
1905 
1913 
1929 
1905 
1913 
1929 
1905 
1913 
1929 
1905 
1913 
1929 
1905 
1913 
1929 
administration 
cane 
30.3 
13.4 
18.3 
27.8 
18.7 
24.6 
22.6 
8.8 
12.6 
27.4 
8.1 
4.S 
24.6 
16.1 
11.5 
5S.5 
10.6 
14.5 
41.9 
17.6 
32.7 
colonos del colonos 
central independientes 
33.1 36.S 
56.9 29.7 
65.9 15.7 
30.S 41.7 
44.3 37.0 
46.8 28.6 
38.0 39.4 
SO.3 40.9 
74.S 12.9 
35.2 37.3 
46.8 45.1 
S8.9 36.5 
26.4 49.0 
SO.6 33.3 
70.5 18.0 
43.5 1.1 
79.2 10.2 
77.1 8.4 
40.4 17.6 
72.1 10.3 
S5.0 12.3 
Table 3 (cont.). 42 
no. observations 
sample sizes: 1905 179 
1913 98 
1929 136 
Sources. Republica de Cuba, Secretarfa de Hacienda (1904/05); Republica de Cuba, Secretarla de Agricultura, 
Comercio, y Trabajo (1912-14, 1930) 
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Figure 1. 
Cuban sugar production. 1860-1932. 
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Figure 3. 
Price of Cuban sugars in New York, cost and freight.a 
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Sources. Willett and Gray (1911, 1930, 1940); Czamikow-Rionda (1939). 
"-"', a Average annual prices for Cuban 96° pol. centrifugal sugars (the grade most commonly traded 
throughout the world) presented net of of duties. 
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